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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000500020024-7

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The attached chart is an attempt to depict the probable trend of the power positions of the US and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet bloc on the other hand, for the next two years, 1951-mid 1953. The chart is in terms of numbers that may be called "power coefficients." These represent the total strategic value of a state or group of states to the side with which it is aligned — taking into account military, economic, political, psychological, and geographic factors.

The chart is not intended as a presentation device for any other group than O/NE, but solely as a vehicle for thought in the preparation of the grand estimate for NSC, SPP #26. A number of specific caveats are indicated on p. 3.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 1991
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HK 76-2
DATE: 14 JAN 81 REVIEWER: 018557

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SAVEATS

1. In computing Q and Q^1 , the likelihood of change in status of CC, Jug., WE, and SEA has been assessed roughly at: CC, 10%; Jug., 15%; WE, 45%; SEA, 60%.

2. Chart is static. Does not show possible emerging trends of '53, such as (a) greater solidarity of WE; (b) possible drift away of Japan; (c) trend in India to greater alignment with West.

3. Chart is purely an aggregate estimate. To show possible vulnerability of particular areas it is necessary to have for the area (a) the power coefficients that can actually be brought to bear there; (b) the attack-defense ratio (political or military or both) required for successful take-over. For example, in the case of Western Europe the power coefficients might stack up about thus in 1953:

	<u>West</u>		<u>Soviet</u>
US	15*	USSR	40
WH	1	E. Sat.	9
EC	1		
WE	10		
JUG.	<u>3</u>		<u>—</u>
	30		49

If the critical ratio is assessed at about 5:3, then the Soviets would not have decisive superiority.

Where the take-over would be partly or largely by political means, a lower critical ratio may prevail. This is particularly true in such unstable areas as WE and SEA.

* Includes deterrent effect of US air power.

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REMARKS

- 1/ Excludes a full evaluation of atomic superiority. This is worth about 20 more as a deterrent but does not enter into the pressure balance much.
- 2/ Canada, Mexico, CA, and SA.
- 3/ Australia, NZ, S. Africa, Ireland (not Malaya or UK proper or India-Pakistan)
- 4/ Includes colonies except for Indo-China.
- 5/ Greece, Turkey, Iran, Arab States, Israel.
- 6/ Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia.
- 7/ Includes bases overseas.

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MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

- I. $\frac{A}{A^1}$ (present ratio) $< \frac{Q}{Q^1}$: relative strength of West most likely will increase
 but $(Q^1 - Q) > (A^1 - A)$: absolute superiority of Soviet will increase
- II. $\frac{A}{A^1} > \frac{Q}{Q^1}$ or $\frac{D}{D^1}$: relative strength of West would decline if either
 (1) let-up, or (2) major losses of specific areas.
- III. $\frac{D}{D^1} \sim 50\%$: if (1) let-up, (2) major losses, (3) maximum Soviet build-up; then Soviet would have 2-1 superiority.
- IV. $A > B \rightarrow$ Western strength could actually decline in absolute terms.
- V. The areas of greatest possible variation are CC, US, WE, Japan, India, NE, and SEA. CC chaos would cost the Soviet bloc 4 points; a switch to its own policies between 6 and 15 points. The strength of WE has a potential variation of 6 points, the rearmament of the US 8 points, Japan 2.

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